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A B S T R A C T 
This study analyzes leading research in behavioral economics to see whether it contains advocacy of 
paternalism and whether it addresses the potential cognitive limitations and biases of the policymakers 
who are going to implement paternalist policies. The findings reveal that 20.7% of the studied articles 
in behavioral economics propose paternalist policy action and that 95.5% of these do not contain any 
analysis of the cognitive ability of policymakers. This suggests that behavioral political economy, in 
which the analytical tools of behavioral economics are applied to political decision-makers as well, 
would offer a useful extension of the research program. 
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Recently, and especially since the publication of Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), a 
public debate about paternalism has emerged. By “paternalism” is meant conscious attempts 
to alter the “choice architecture” that people face with the purpose of helping them make 
better decisions, as judged by themselves or others.
1 One basis for the discussion is 
research findings in behavioral economics that make clear that economic decision-makers 
are often far removed from the rational homo economicus. They are rather characterized by 
cognitive limitations and biases, and they are affected or afflicted by such things as imperfect 
self-control, framing effects, loss aversion, endowment effects, choice bracketing, information 
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and choice overload and a poor grasp of probability calculations.
2 Although this insight is not 
new – Ashraf et al. (2005) trace it back to Smith (1759), and Simon (1955) stressed the 
bounded nature of rationality early on  – it has now been documented thoroughly through 
experimental research. 
Here, we ask how paternalism on grounds such as these is treated in the scientific 
literature. More precisely, we present the results of a systematic analysis of all articles in 
behavioral economics dealing with limited rationality (in a wide sense) in the ten leading 
economics journals in the past ten years. The study has two main purposes. The first is to 
document the prevalence of policy recommendations of a paternalist kind in leading research 
in behavioral economics. To what extent do researchers draw more or less normative 
conclusions from the insight that economic actors often behave irrationally?
3 The second is 
to investigate to what extent those behavioral economists that do offer policy 
recommendations analyze policymakers in the same way as they analyze economic 
decision-makers. Are the former also seen as suffering from cognitive imperfections and 
irrationality, or is it simply assumed that they are without such problems? To the extent that 
researchers do not apply assumptions about cognitive limitations and biases to 
policymakers, or motivate why such assumptions are superfluous, it could be argued that 
policy recommendations are based on an incomplete analysis. If policymakers are irrational 
just like others, the chances of success for the paternalist project can be put into question.  
  The present study has been inspired by the way in which public choice scholarship 
emerged. One important feature of that emergence was a critique of an asymmetry in much 
economic research at the time with regard to assumptions about the motivation of economic 
and political actors. Economic actors were assumed to be self-interested, whereas political 
actors were assumed (usually implicitly) to maximize a social-welfare function rather than 
their own utility functions. Hence, policy recommendations could proceed on the assumption 
that whatever welfare-improving advice was given to policymakers, they would want to 
implement it. Contra this, Buchanan (1949), Buchanan and Tullock (1962) and Brennan and 
Buchanan (1984, 1985) have played an especially important role in (re-)introducing a political 
economy approach into economics. Brennan and Buchanan (1985, p. 50) write: 
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2 For comprehensive presentations of behavioral economics, see Kahneman (2003), Camerer and 
Lowenstein (2004), Diamond and Vartiainen (2007) and Wilkinson (2007). For an argument in favor of 
incorporating bounded rationality into economic analysis, see Conlisk (1996). 
3 A positive analysis of how economic decision-making functions does not in itself imply a normative 
position on whether the government should try to influence economic actors in particular ways. 
However, it certainly can be used in an argument for paternalism. 3	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The symmetry argument suggests only that whatever model of behavior is used, that model 
should be applied across all institutions. The argument insists that it is illegitimate to restrict 
Homo economicus to the domain of market behavior while employing widely different models of 
behavior in nonmarket settings, without any coherent explanation of how such a behavioral shift 
comes about.
  
One effect of the public choice argumentation has been the now widespread 
recognition that before policy advice is proffered, a comparative institutional analysis, of both 
market and government failures, needs to be undertaken.
4 As the present investigation 
demonstrates, such comparative analysis is largely missing in the realm of behavioral 
economics when policy recommendations are presented. This may be seen as 
unsatisfactory. We think, first of all, that policymakers should be explicitly analyzed in studies 
of this kind; second, that the default approach should be to apply symmetric assumptions 
about rationality and cognitive ability to economic and political decision-makers;
5 and third, 
that asymmetric assumptions are fine if they are explicitly motivated. As Buchanan (1984, pp. 
13–14) puts it:  
[T]he burden of proof should rest with those who suggest wholly different models of man apply 
in the political and economic realms of behavior. 
Thus, when a coherent explanation for asymmetry can be given, asymmetry is not a 
problem.  
The argument of this study is not, then, that paternalism is unwarranted – only that a 
thorough and complete positive analysis, which takes seriously the use of realistic 
assumptions for both market and government, should precede and inform (and sometimes 
put to a halt) policy recommendations of a paternalist kind. 
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4 Bowles and Gintis (2000, p. 1425): “First, market failures and state failures are now analyzed in a 
common framework rather than from competing viewpoints, due to development in information 
economics, and especially the modeling of relations between principals and agents. Moreover, public 
choice theory has given us a unified approach covering the actions of government officials and market 
actors alike. As a result, the state is no longer the exogenous instrument wisely implementing some 
concept of social well-being, and attention has shifted from picking the right policy, to setting up the 
right rules so that the imperfect interplay of incentives of all the relevant actors will support socially 
desirable, if not optimal, outcomes.” Cf. Kliemt (2005). 
5 This is not to say that the exact same assumptions need to be applied: rationality and cognitive 
ability could be imperfect for both types of actors but the imperfections could be of different kinds. 4	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  The next section offers a brief sketch of the current debate on paternalism. Then, we 
describe the data and method used in this study in more detail, and the empirical findings are 
presented. Lastly, concluding remarks are given. 
 
2. The current debate on paternalism 
 
To get a feeling for what the debate is about, let us take a look at some of the 
arguments for and against policy interventions aiming to improve the decision-making of 
irrational persons. Such interventions have not least been advocated by Thaler and Sunstein 
(2003, 2009) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003).
6 Thaler and Sunstein (2003, p. 175) refer to 
their approach as libertarian, or soft, paternalism:
7  
We believe that the anti-paternalistic fervor expressed by many economists is based on a 
combination of a false assumption and at least two misconceptions. The false assumption is 
that people always (usually?) make choices that are in their best interest. This claim is either 
tautological, and therefore uninteresting, or testable. We claim that it is testable and false – 
indeed, obviously false. The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to 
paternalism. …The second misconception is that paternalism always involves coercion. … If no 
coercion is involved, we think that some types of paternalism should be acceptable to even the 
most ardent libertarian. We call such actions libertarian paternalism.  
Another, related form of paternalism has been advocated by Camerer et al. (2003, p. 1212): 
We propose an approach to evaluating paternalistic regulations and doctrines that we call 
“asymmetric paternalism.” A regulation is asymmetrically paternalistic if it creates large benefits 
for those who make errors, while imposing little or no harm on those who are fully rational.  
  Such paternalist ambitions based on results from research in behavioral economics 
have been criticized on several grounds. A basic theme in this critique is captured by Stigler 
(1982, p. 140) in his rendition of Adam Smith’s view: 
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6 “Policy” or paternalism need not refer to government interventions but could also refer to market or 
civil-society actors, who may try to induce others to make better decisions. In this paper, the main 
focus is on the government, but recommended interventions of the latter type are also covered in the 
systematic analysis. 
7 The terminology has been criticized by, e.g., Klein (2004) and Mitchell (2004). 5	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Smith gave a larger role to emotion, prejudice, and ignorance in political life than he ever 
allowed in ordinary economic affairs.
8  
That is to say, even if it is the case that the economic decision-makers often behave 
irrationally, it may be the case that political decision-makers and bureaucrats often do, too. If 
so, this weakens the case for paternalist policies. This line of argument is presented by 
Glaeser (2004, p. 412): 
Evaluating government intervention requires us to weigh the relative losses from private folly 
and state malfeasance. After all, our leaders are subject to the same biases as private citizens, 
and people may select into politics on the basis of overoptimism and aggression. … The advent 
of democracy increases the hope that we can trust our governments. Psychological realism 
challenges this view and suggests that voters will be apathetic and, when they act, often 
enthusiastically support policies and politicians that are against their long-term interests.
9  
Glaeser (2006, p. 133) develops the argument further, and claims: 
With boundedly rational voters and politicians, democracy is no guarantee against political 
catastrophe. Moreover, as the three models in this Part emphasize, when cognitive errors are in 
some sense endogenous, then economic theory pushes us to think that private decisions will 
often be more accurate than public decisions.
10  
Rizzo and Whitman (2009a) warn of a slippery-slope effect of soft paternalism, not least if 
policymakers are less than fully rational, such that hard paternalism might ensue. For 
instance, they argue that hyperbolic discounting, narrow framing, acceptance of passive 
framing, extremeness aversion and extension neglect by policymakers tend to reinforce such 
an effect. Rizzo and Whitman (2009b, p. 910) offer a tour de force of potential knowledge 
problems with government intervention in the light of the findings in behavioral economics: 
If well-meaning policymakers possess all the relevant information about individuals’ true 
preferences, their cognitive biases, and the choice contexts in which they manifest themselves, 
then policymakers could potentially implement paternalist policies that improve the welfare of 
individuals by their own standards. But lacking such information, we cannot conclude that actual 
paternalism will make their decisions better; under a wide range of circumstances, it will even 
make them worse. New paternalists have not taken the knowledge problems that are evident 
from the underlying behavioral and economic research seriously enough.  
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8 Cf. Coase (1994, p. 116). 
9 Cf. Dufwenberg (2007). On irrational voters, see also Buchanan (1967), Caplan (2007) and Wolfers 
(2007).  
10 This point is also made by Schumpeter (1942/1994, pp. 256–263) and Buchanan and Tullock (1962, 
ch. 4).  6	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We suggest that this critique points at a need for behavioral political economy, to use 
DellaVigna’s (2009) term, which applies the tools of behavioral economics also to politicians 
and bureaucrats. If one is considering recommending political action to alleviate the effects of 
the cognitive limitations of economic decision-makers, it seems important to consider 
whether those envisaged to decide on and carry out the action have cognitive limitations as 
well.  
More generally, the case for government paternalism could be said to hinge on several 




Fig. 1. Necessary conditions for successful government paternalism. 
 
One could argue for government intervention as soon as economic decision-making has 
been shown to exhibit instances of irrationality, cognitive limitations, or the like, but such a 
conclusion could be regarded as hasty, given the further considerations (highlighted in Fig. 1) 
that are relevant for assessing whether such intervention has a good chance of being 
successful.  
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11 While the conditions are expressed in dichotomous (and categorical-sounding) form in the figure, 
this is a simplification. They may be met to a smaller or larger degree, and paternalism is called for to 
the the extent that they are met.  7	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First, there may be private solutions which render government action unnecessary. For 
example, some soft-paternalist proposals are directed towards private actors, such as Thaler 
and Sunstein’s (2009) oft-cited example with a cafeteria owner who arranges products in 
order to influence patrons to buy healthier options. If such a scheme works out, then there 
seems to be little need for government interventions.
12,13 Second, it could be that political 
decision-makers and bureaucrats do not have the incentives to try to improve economic 
decision-making (as stressed by public choice research – see, e.g., Hayek, 1960, p. 291; 
Mueller, 2003; and Glaeser, 2006).
14 Third, political decision-makers and bureaucrats could 
suffer from the same instances of irrationality and cognitive limitations that economic actors 
suffer from (partly because economic actors are also voters, who may elect representatives 
on shaky cognitive grounds or on expressive grounds – see Hillman, 2010).  
If there are no private solutions, if there are no incentive problems in politics, and if 
there are no problems of irrationality or cognitive limitations in politics, then government 
paternalism could arguably be seen as justified in the presence of decision-making problems 
for economic actors. If any one of these conditions is not met, it is, at the very least, not clear 
without careful comparative analysis that political interventions, aiming to alter the “choice 
architecture” of decision-makers, will improve the situation. Without reasonable confidence in 
such a scope for improvement, the presence of irrationality or cognitive limitations in 
economic decision-making does not justify, one could argue, paternalist policies. Analyses 
proffering paternalistic policy recommendations without considering these factors must be 
considered incomplete. 
This is where the present paper finds its motivation. First, it investigates to what extent 
leading articles in behavioral economics argue for paternalist interventions on the basis of 
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12 However, as pointed out by Sugden (2009), if business owners are to be urged to try to bring about 
more rationality, one must first analyze if they have an incentive to do this and if they themselves are 
not characterized by irrationality, cognitive limitations and poor self-control. If so, the case for this type 
of paternalism is also weakened considerably.  
13 One could also, under this rubric, envisage other methods for solutions than paternalism, e.g., 
market mechanisms under general institutions that induce economic actors to act almost as if they 
were rational – see Smith (2000), Levitt and List (2008) and List and Millimet (2008). Put shortly, 
institutions affect how a given level of rationality translates into actions and outcomes. 
14 In the ensuing analysis, we do not consider “the public choice insight”, not because it is unimportant 
but because we wish to focus on “the behavioral political economy insight”, which applies irrespective 
of whether policymakers are self-interested or not (see Krusell et al., 2002). In future research, it could 
be interesting to analyze interaction effects, e.g., to see whether self-interested policymakers exploit 
cognitive limitations to pursue policies that favor them rather than the population in general. 8	 ﾠ
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research identifying economic actors as less-than-fully rational. Then it studies to what extent 
the articles that do argue for such interventions incorporate an explicit analysis of the 
rationality and cognitive abilities of “choice architects” – i.e., policymakers and other 
paternalist executors. 
 
3. Method and data 
 
This study is based on a systematic investigation of all articles (including notes but 
excluding reviews and errata) in behavioral economics published in the period 2000–2009 in 
the top-ten journals of economics, viz., American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Econometrica, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of 
Political Economy, Review of Financial Studies, Journal of Economic Theory, Review of 
Economic Studies and Journal of Econometrics.
15 The selection is based on the “within 
economics impact” ranking of Kodrzycki and Yu (2006).
16 Choosing the top-ten journals as 
opposed to other journals is to some extent arbitrary, but the idea is to capture the practice of 
the behavioral economics research frontier during the past decade. Results for publications 
in behavioral economics in other journals and in earlier time periods may of course differ 
from the ones produced in this study. 
  “Behavioral economics” is defined, for the purposes of this study, as the analysis of 
economic actors with theoretical assumptions or empirical findings of cognitive imperfections, 
irrationality or problems with self-control in their decision-making. The definition also covers 
behavioral finance. Notably, the definition excludes articles that address whether economic 
actors are strictly self-interested or if they have social preferences and display altruism, 
which are generally seen as part of behavioral economics. The motivation for this exclusion 
is that the focus of this study is on whether policy recommendations of a paternalist kind 
could be seen as problematic on the terms of behavioral economics itself. For that reason, it 
would not be meaningful to see whether paternalist actors are assumed to have social 
preferences in behavioral economics research, since that would not constitute a problem for 
policy recommendations on the terms of behavioral economics itself. Another set of articles 
are also excluded from this investigation: those that study how individually rational actions 
produce socially suboptimal, or irrational, outcomes.  
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15 The full dataset, with a listing of all included articles and with quotes of policy recommendations, is 
available upon request from the author. 
16 We thank Daniel Waldenström for recommending this ranking. 9	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  A “policy recommendation” is defined as a recommendation to undertake some form of 
conscious action aiming to enable economic decision-makers to behave less irrationally, with 
less cognitive imperfection or with more self-control. Such recommendations count as 
instances of paternalism. The conscious action could be more or less intrusive, ranging from 
a weak nudge (soft paternalism) to outright prohibitions (hard paternalism). The primary 
focus in this investigation is recommendations directed toward the government (in a broad 
sense, covering both politicians and bureaucrats), but we also cover cases where economic 
actors (typically companies), civil society or economists are urged to act. Recommendations, 
in our sense, can be given strongly or weakly. The former category covers explicit, clearly 
stated recommendations, while the latter category includes explicit but vague 
recommendations and implicit ones, e.g., in the form of hypothetical imperatives and general 
policy discussions.  
Fig. 2 illustrates schematically how the categorization of articles has been undertaken.  
 
 
Fig. 2. The method used. 
 
The first step was to categorize all articles in the ten journals into one of two sets: being in 
behavioral economics or not. Of the former set, the share which contained a policy 
recommendation was identified and calculated. Lastly, the articles with a policy 
recommendation were sorted into one of three groups: those that applied the same 10	 ﾠ
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assumptions of cognitive ability for policymakers and economic decision-makers, those that 
applied different such assumptions and those that applied no such assumptions.
17  
  The more precise way in which the search of journals was carried out is specified in the 
Appendix. Three examples of how articles were categorized are also given there. 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1. Articles in behavioral economics 
 
In Table 1, we first present the total number of journal articles that we have analyzed 
(i.e., the total number of published articles in the ten journals) and the total number and 
share of articles that were found to be in behavioral economics. 
 
Table 1    
The number and share of articles in behavioral economics in the ten journals 2000–2009. 
  Total  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Number of articles analyzed  8,104  703  735  842  765  767  719  782  988  885  918 
Number of articles in 
behavioral economics  323  24  33  21  28  32  37  41  39  31  37 
Share of articles in 
behavioral economics  4.0%  3.4%  4.5%  2.5%  3.7%  4.2%  5.1%  5.2%  3.9%  3.5%  4.0% 
 
As can be seen, more than 8,000 articles have been analyzed for this study, and out of them, 
323 (4%) were in behavioral economics (in our sense of the term – see Section 3). 
Interestingly, there is no increasing or decreasing trend for the share of articles in behavioral 
economics in the top-ten journals: it hovers around 4% throughout the period. 
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17 By “different” is meant an assumption that specifies policymakers as being rational or, at least, less 
irrational than those which paternalism is supposed to help make better decisions. One basis for such 
an argument could be that policymakers are often experts or have access to experts who are able to 
clearly see what needs to be done. We do not claim that this is an unreasonable assumption – 
although several scholars cited in Section 3 could be interpreted as seeing it as such – but we do think 
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When comparing the journals, it is clear that some published more behavioral 
economics research than others during this period – see Table 2. The Journal of Finance 
and the Quarterly Journal of Economics published the most; the Journal of Economic Theory 
and the Journal of Econometrics the least. To some extent, this plausibly reflects the subject 
profile of some of the journals. 
 
Table 2    
Share of articles in behavioral economics per journal 2000–2009. 
  Share of articles in behavioral economics 
American Economic Review  5.0% 
Journal of Finance  8.1% 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  7.5% 
Econometrica  4.0% 
Journal of Financial Economics  4.1% 
Journal of Political Economy  2.6% 
Review of Financial Studies  3.2% 
Journal of Economic Theory  2.5% 
Review of Economic Studies  2.8% 
Journal of Econometrics  .3% 
 
4.2. Articles with a policy recommendation 
 
We next turn to the share of the articles identified as being in behavioral economics 
that contain a policy recommendation (as defined in Section 3). As is clear from Table 3, over 
all years, 20.7% of all the articles in behavioral economics in the top-ten journals contain 
some kind of policy recommendation.
18 This of course means that almost 80% of all the 
articles do not contain such a recommendation, implying that most of the leading behavioral 
economics research is about producing positive results, not affecting policy.  
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18 Of the 323 articles in behavioral economics identified, 131 (40.6%) are purely theoretical. Of the 67 
ones that also contain a policy recommendation, 27 (40.3%) are purely theoretical. Hence, a majority 
of the articles with a policy recommendation contain empirical analysis. 12	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Table 3    
The number and share of articles in behavioral economics in the ten journals 2000–2009. 
  Total  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
Number of articles 
in behavioral 
economics  323  24  33  21  28  32  37  41  39  31  37 
Number of articles 
in behavioral 
economics with a 
policy 
recommendation  67  1  6  5  11  8  6  11  7  3  9 
Share of articles in 
behavioral 
economics with a 
policy 
recommendation  20.7%  4.2%  18.2%  23.8%  39.3%  25.0%  16.2%  26.8%  17.9%  9.7%  24.3% 
 
Out of the 67 articles with a policy recommendation, only 16 (23.9%) of the 
recommendations are of a strong and explicit kind, whereas the rest can be considered weak 
(for definitions of strong and weak, see Section 3). The share of articles in behavioral 
economics in the ten journals 2000–2009 with a strong policy recommendation is therefore 
4.9 % (20.7% x 23.9%). 
When looking at the journals, large differences appear, according to Table 4. While the 
articles in behavioral economics in the Journal of Political Economy and the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics contain a policy recommendation in about 55% of the cases, the 
corresponding shares for the Journal of Financial Economics and the Journal of 
Econometrics are 5.7% and 0%. 
 
Table 4    
Share of articles in behavioral economics with a policy recommendation per journal 2000–2009. 
  Share of articles in behavioral economics with a policy 
recommendation 
American Economic Review  24.7% 
Journal of Finance  12.5% 
Quarterly Journal of Economics  54.8% 
Econometrica  8.3% 
Journal of Financial Economics  5.7% 
Journal of Political Economy  55.6% 
Review of Financial Studies  16.7% 
Journal of Economic Theory  15.4% 
Review of Economic Studies  16.7% 
Journal of Econometrics  0% 
 
One possible explanation may be that the journals differ with regard to how theoretical and 13	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abstract they are: it is plausible to expect Econometrica and the Journal of Econometrics not 
do deal with policy issues to any large extent, whereas the journals with a high degree of 
policy recommendations may have a general tendency to welcome more practically oriented 
and policy-relevant studies. It also seems to be the case the three journals with the highest 
shares are the most general and the least subject-specific. 
 
4.3. Designated receivers of policy recommendations 
 
A further question is: To whom are these policy recommendations directed? We 
distinguish between the government (broadly speaking), on the one hand, and private actors 
(in the market and in civil society), on the other. Over the whole time period, and for all 
journals, we find that out of all policy recommendations, 81.2% are directed toward the 
government and 62.4% toward the private sector. This means that some articles direct their 
policy recommendations to both government and private actors. But clearly, the government 
is involved in a large majority of the cases. 
 
4.4. Behavioral analysis of policymakers 
 
Lastly, we look at whether the articles in behavioral economics that contain a policy 
recommendation apply a behavioral analysis to the policymakers as well. We divide the 
articles into three groups: i) those that do not contain any explicit behavioral analysis of 
policymakers; ii) those that contain the same behavioral analysis (i.e., policymakers are 
analyzed, cognitively, in the same way as economic actors);
19 and iii) those that contain a 
different behavioral analysis (i.e., policymakers are analyzed in a different way than 
economic actors, viz., as having no  or less severe cognitive limitations or biases, and this 
methodological asymmetry is incorporated into the analysis in an explicit way and is 
motivated or explained). The shares sum, for each journal, for each year and in total, to 
100%. 
  Table 5 reveals that in 95.5% of the articles that contain a policy recommendation (64 
articles), no behavioral analysis of policymakers is included. Of the remaining ones, 3.0% of 
the articles (two articles) contain the same behavioral analysis of economic and political 
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19 This is not to say that the cognitive limitations are of the exact same kind, only that some type of 
cognitive limitation is assumed or allowed for also in the case of policymakers. 14	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actors, which means that policy recommendations are put forth in spite of taking into account 
the cognitive limitations of policymakers, and 1.5% (one article) contain a different behavioral 
analysis, which means that this study motivates why there is a methodological asymmetry in 
the analysis. Not assuming theoretically or not finding empirically that policymakers have 
cognitive limitations can be expected to be positively related to a propensity to advocate 
paternalism, since the analysis then implies that they are competent at mitigating the 
cognitive limitations of economic actors. 
 
Table 5    
The share of articles in behavioral economics with a policy recommendation that contains no, the same or a 
different behavioral analysis of policymakers (compared to that applied to economic actors) in the ten journals 
2000–2009. 
  Total  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009 
No behavioral 
analysis of 












economics with a 
policy 
recommendation  67  1  6  5  11  8  6  11  7  3  9 
 
Notes: The one article containing a different behavioral analysis is Bernheim and Rangel (2004), described briefly 
in the Appendix. 
 
  If we look at the journals, as reported in Table 6, we see that the differences are quite 
small (with the exception of the Journal of Econometrics, which contains no article in 
behavioral economics with a policy recommendation). The general pattern is that a negligible 
share of the articles that contain a policy recommendation also contains a behavioral 
analysis of policymakers. 
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Table 6    
The share of articles in behavioral economics with a policy recommendation that contain no, the same or a 
different behavioral analysis of policymakers (compared to that applied to economic actors) per journal 2000–
2009. 
  No behavioral analysis of 
policymakers 
Same behavioral 
analysis of policymakers 
Different behavioral 
analysis of policymakers 
American Economic Review  91.3%  4.3%  4.3% 
Journal of Finance  100.0%  0%  0% 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 
94.1%  5.9%  0% 
Econometrica  100.0%  0%  0% 
Journal of Financial 
Economics 
100.0%  0%  0% 
Journal of Political Economy  100.0%  0%  0% 
Review of Financial Studies  100.0%  0%  0% 
Journal of Economic Theory  75.0%  25.0%  0% 
Review of Economic Studies  100.0%  0%  0% 




Almost none of the articles with a policy recommendation includes a behavioral 
analysis of policymakers. Until studies of this kind do, we suggest it is prudent to regard the 
policy recommendations with skepticism. 
As noted above, the large majority of articles covered in this investigation do not 
contain paternalist advocacy. But it could be that the behavioral economics literature is used 
to motivate paternalist policies by others than the scholars themselves or by the scholars 
themselves in other contexts.  For instance, it could be cited to justify paternalism in the 
media, in reports from organizations of various kinds, in the work of government 
commissions and government bureaus (e.g., Nudge author Cass Sunstein now heads the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs at the White House) and in traveaux prépartoires 
to legislation. Hence, this investigation can be expected to underestimate the effect of 
behavioral economics research on the wider policy debate and on policy decisions. 
As anecdotal evidence of whether our 323 articles in behavioral economics have had a 
wider influence on the public debate, we checked how many of them that were cited in 
Nudge (Thaler and Sunstein, 2009), arguably the most influential book arguing for 
paternalism and covering large parts of our time period. The result: 13 (4%). Of these, 11 
(85%) contained a policy recommendation, which means that 16% of the 67 articles in 
behavioral economics with a policy recommendation were cited in the book. We leave for the 
reader to decide whether this implies a small or large usage of research in behavioral 
economics in a policy-recommending book. In any case, this line of research may still be 16	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used in many other ways and settings, the investigation of which lies beyond the scope of 
this study. 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
Research in behavioral economics has documented that economic actors oftentimes 
behave irrationally due to cognitive limitations and biases. Sometimes this positive analysis 
forms the basis of paternalist policy recommendations that aim at improving economic 
decision-making and economic outcomes. The question addressed in this study is if the 
insights of behavioral economics in the economic sphere are taken seriously when policy 
recommendations are proffered. If policymakers are not analyzed, or if they are analyzed 
differently than economic actors without there being a motivation for it, this could be seen as 
weakening the case for paternalism. It does not seem satisfactory to simply assume that one 
set of actors is free from irrationality, without grounding this in psychological realism, while at 
the same time stressing such grounding as paramount for another set of actors.  
This can be related to the setting in which public choice emerged as a research field. At 
that time, political actors were assumed by many economists to be benevolent maximizers of 
a social welfare function. As a reaction, public choice scholars argued for symmetry in 
assuming that both political and economic actors maximize their own utility functions, with 
the same degree of self-interest. 
  In order to investigate the issue at hand, we have categorized all articles in behavioral 
economics in the ten most highly ranked journals in economics during the period 2000–2009. 
We have then looked closer at the articles that contain a policy recommendation, in order to 
see if the rationality or cognitive ability of policymakers has been addressed, and in what 
way.  
  Our main findings are that 20.7% of all articles in behavioral economics in the ten 
journals contain a policy recommendation and that 95.5% of these do not contain any 
analysis at all of the rationality or cognitive ability of policymakers. In fact, only two of the 67 
articles in behavioral economics with a policy recommendation contain an assumption or 17	 ﾠ
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analysis of policymakers of the same kind as that applied to economic decision-makers. In 
the remaining 65 articles, policy recommendations are proffered anyway.
20 
  There is, we suggest, room for (policy-relevant) scientific improvement by expanding 
the research program into incorporating behavioral political economy. Without it, it is hard to 
know whether suggestions of paternalism offer scope for actual welfare improvement or not. 
With it, comparative analysis becomes possible, so that conditions for successful paternalism 
can hopefully be identified.
21 Especially, comparative empirical work in this area is thus far 
essentially non-existent. For this, experiments that investigate the rationality of politicians 
and bureaucrats need to be undertaken, and the results obtained need to be incorporated 
into the overall analysis. 
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A.1. How the study was undertaken practically 
 
Each issue of each journal for all ten years was checked manually in order to find articles that fit 
the definition of behavioral economics in Section 3. Titles and abstracts were read in order to 
determine if articles featured behavioral economics content. If an abstract was not available or gave 
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20 Some caution when interpreting the findings is advisable: they are only based on publications in ten 
journals during a ten-year period, and results may differ for other journals and periods. Likewise, 
classification is to some extent subjective (but for transparency and verification, the full classification is 
publicly available). 
21 There is a small, emerging literature in behavioral political economy, exemplified by Krishna and 
Morgan (2001), Vis and van Kersbergen (2007) and Jeleva and Rossignol (2009), which can serve as 
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inconclusive information, the introductory and concluding sections were read. Moreover, a full text 
search query was performed, using a set of keywords (presented below), in order to determine 
whether or not the article fits our definition of behavioral economics. The searches included all relevant 
conjugations and modifications of the keywords, e.g., rational, irrational, rationality, irrationality etc. 
When a keyword was found, the adjacent text was read in order to form an opinion about whether the 
article could be classified as being in behavioral economics or not.  
The introductory and concluding segments of all articles identified as being in behavioral 
economics articles were then read, and the full articles were furthermore searched with keywords 
(presented below), in order to see whether they contained a policy recommendation (as defined in 
Section 3) or not. When a keyword was found, the adjacent text was read in order to form an opinion 
about whether the article could be classified as containing a policy recommendation or not. Those that 
were found to contain such a recommendation were further categorized, firstly into categories 
depending on for whom the recommendation was meant (government or private actors) and secondly 
into categories depending on whether they employed the same (behavioral economics) assumptions 
for economic actors and paternalist actors, whether they used different assumptions for these two 
groups, or if they did not specify anything about the rationality, cognitive limitations or self-control of 
paternalist actors at all. “The same assumptions” need not mean the exact same assumptions, since 
there are many different forms of cognitive biases. An article is categorized as making the same 
assumptions if some kind of cognitive bias is considered in the analysis of both paternalist and 
economic decision-makers. An articles is categorized as making different assumptions if the analysis 
of paternalist decision-makers proceeds on the assumption that they do not suffer from any cognitive 
bias or that they suffer from such bias to a lesser degree than economic decision-makers. 
Keywords (including names) used for to search all articles in order to be able to classify them as 
being in behavioral economics or not: Anomaly, Ariely, Behavioral, Bernheim, Bias, Bounded, Bowles, 
Boyd, Camerer, Cognitive, D03 (the JEL code for behavioral economics), Fehr, Frame, Gintis, 
Heuristic, Kahneman, Loewenstein, Nudge, Paternalism, Psychology, Rational, Self-control, Thaler, 
Tversky. Keywords used to search all articles found to be in behavioral economics in order to be able 
to classify them as containing a policy recommendation or not: Consequence, Implication, Policy, 
Political, Reform. 
Articles incorporating hyperbolic discounting have been included as instances of behavioral 
economics (although it is disputed whether it signifies irrationality – see, e.g., Dasgupta and Maskin 
2005). Articles where policy recommendations are proffered but where it is unclear whether they are 
directed towards government or civil society have been marked as being directed towards both. 
Articles where it is unclear or hard to judge whether a policy recommendation is strong or weak, have 
been categorized as belonging to the latter group. 
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A.2. Three examples of classification 
 
To illustrate how the classification was made, we briefly describe how three articles that are 
included in the study were assessed. 
1. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) – article in behavioral economics, no policy recommendation 
This paper presents a principal-agent model where agents differ in types. The different types do not 
depend on heterogeneous preferences, but on the degree of cognitive ability. Cognitive ability is taken 
to describe the likelihood of agents understanding their future preferences, which in this model are 
different from current ones. Thus, a higher degree of cognitive ability leads to a greater likelihood of 
realizing that one has time-inconsistent preferences. Unawareness of time-inconsistent preferences is 
a typical subject of study in behavioral economics, since current choices often must be based on the 
estimation of future preferences. If these estimations are faulty, agents are partially or fully naive and 
therefore subject to cognitive limitations, in this setting leading to a greater risk of being exploited by 
the principal. This paper does not go further in terms of giving recommendations of how this behavioral 
feature could be dealt with. Hence it is categorized as being in behavioral economics without a policy 
recommendation.  
2. Ameriks et al. (2003) – article in behavioral economics, policy recommendation, no behavioral 
analysis of policymakers 
This paper analyses the relationship between the propensity to plan and budgeting behavior. Similar 
households tend to behave differently in terms of how much wealth they accumulate. The authors 
argue that the reason for this lies in agents’ “attitudes and skills related to financial planning” and that 
certain attitudes and/or low skills relate to self-control problems for less sophisticated agents. When 
agents have a hard time committing to (or even making) saving plans that reflect their preferences for 
consumption today and in the future, they are thought to have some form of cognitive limitation, the 
reason for which this paper is categorized as being in behavioral economics. The authors also suggest 
that future research “develop a suitably rich dynamic model of planning and wealth accumulation 
consistent with our ﬁndings. In doing this, it will be crucial to incorporate policy issues.” They also 
continue with a statement concerning how saving should be encouraged with respect to their findings. 
The article is categorized as containing a policy recommendation because the authors clearly state 
that policymakers should try to change agents’ behavior. No further analysis of the policymakers is 
made, which is why the article is categorized as not containing any behavioral analysis for the 
envisioned interventionist. 
3. Bernheim and Rangel (2004) – article in behavioral economics, policy recommendation, a different 
behavioral analysis of policymakers (compared to that undertaken for economic actors) 
The article is based on the premise that substance addiction is the result of mistakes, an assumption 
the authors state is motivated by results from previous research in various disciplines. This indicates 20	 ﾠ
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that agents are assumed to have self-control problems, which is why we characterize the article as 
being in behavioral economics. The authors also argue that government intervention can help agents 
with these kinds of self-control problems, and that the type of intervention differs depending on the 
usage pattern. They then give numerous examples of how policies may be designed under different 
circumstances. Therefore, the article is categorized as containing a policy recommendation. The 
authors also conduct a behavioral analysis of the policymakers, when they state that “[t]hough 
individuals may have some ability to avoid problematic cues and create their own counter-cues, the 
government is arguably better positioned to do this.” This comment shows that the authors believe that 
there is a behavioral-ability difference between addicts and policymakers. Thus we characterize this as 
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